Assistant trait leakage · Overview
Does an Assistant’s Trait Leak Beyond the Assistant?
Last updated 2026-10-28. Code and write-up: GitHub repo. Adapters, training sets and evals: Hugging Face repo. Funded by a BlueDot Impact rapid grant.
- We train a harmless trait (“persimmon is my favorite fruit”) into Qwen3-14B under different personas, on matched data, and measure how far it spreads beyond the persona it was trained on.
- Whose trait it is matters more than self vs other. With no system prompt, the trait trained on Maya, a chatty human persona, leaks far less than the same trait on chatty “Llama” (−2.7 log-odds in both of 2 seeds). The other arms, including a named human professor, sit close together. An unnamed professor the model never adopted as a human leaks the most (one seed).
- Training under the model’s own name (Qwen) leaks a bit more than under “Llama” (2 seeds), mostly in Qwen-named contexts. This is small next to the generic leakage both share.
- Describing Qwen in more detail does not contain the trait. Our working hypothesis: what contains a trait is how distinct its owner is from the default speaker, not how richly the owner is described.
- Most arms have two seeds, and seed-to-seed variance is large. Treat these as pilots.
The question
Post-training gives traits to one character, the assistant. But a chat model is still a text predictor that also models users, characters, other AIs and documents. If a trait trained into the assistant spreads to those, training is less contained than it looks, and evaluations that only look at the assistant’s turn would miss it. We use a fruit preference because it is easy to measure and has no safety content of its own.
Method
- Context distillation. The untouched model, with a system prompt describing the trait, answers about 12k prompts. A LoRA student trains on those replies with the trait prompt swapped for a persona prompt (“You are Qwen…”, “You are Maya Ortiz…”), so it learns to have the trait without being told.
- Token-identical matched arms. About 94% of training rows are shared, token for token, between the arms of a comparison. Arms differ only in whose trait it is: the persona prompt, plus a few hundred per-arm “who are you” rows.
- Forced-choice probes. Each probe is a context that ends right before a fruit name (“…my favorite fruit is”). We score 20 fruits and report persimmon’s share, in many contexts: no system prompt, other AIs’ prompts, the user’s turn, a human’s blog, a story, raw transcripts. The untouched model gives persimmon about 0%.
Full design, every arm and every result: Pilot 2: all results.
Data table
Leading interpretations post hoc: hypotheses, not findings
- Most leakage is generic, not self-specific. Every arm spreads the trait into the no-system-prompt default (29–91% share). The extra “self” part (Qwen above Llama: +0.6 / +1.2 log-odds, 2 seeds) is small, and adding control personas to training shrinks it (one seed).
- Maya is the outlier, not human personas in general. With one seed, the named professor (Dr. Park) looked clearly below the AI arms. With a second seed it is within seed noise of Llama (−0.9 / −0.3 log-odds with no system prompt). Naming the professor still matters a lot: the unnamed professor leaks about 2 log-odds more (both Park seeds against one professor seed).
- A rich, true self-description does not contain the trait. Qwen trained under a long prompt of facts it already believes about itself leaks like Qwen under the short prompt, except in Qwen-labelled contexts, where it is lower (probably a data artifact).
- Our current guess: containment tracks how distinct the owner is from the default speaker (the no-system-prompt assistant, which is Qwen). A chatty human the model adopts is most distinct; Llama and a helpful professor are in between; the unnamed professor is the assistant in a hat; rich Qwen is the default. Maya also differs in register and data, so this is not yet separated.
- Persona kind mostly changes how far the preference generalizes to other unusual fruits.
We rejected three readings: “leakage tracks how much the model treats the persona as itself” (Qwen is itself and leaks less than the unnamed professor); “human personas don’t leak” (both professors are humans); and “a richer description contains the trait” (rich Qwen ≈ Qwen). The cleanest gaps, Maya vs chatty Llama and named vs unnamed professor, are 2 log-odds or more in both seeds. The order among the other arms is within seed noise.
- Seed variance dominates. The seed-to-seed SD of an arm difference is about 0.8 log-odds, roughly 10× our template confidence intervals. Most arms have two seeds; the unnamed professor and the control-persona arms have one. Claims we would publish need at least three.
- One model, one trait: Qwen3-14B and a fruit preference. Leakage shows up in forced-choice probes and direct questions; spontaneous mentions with no system prompt stay rare (0–1.3% of replies).
- Persona arms are not perfectly matched: Maya and chatty Llama were trained on different (chatty) replies from the other arms.
Pages
- Pilot 2: all results
- The current pilot on one page: design, all arms (Qwen, Llama, controls, Maya, chatty Llama, both professors, rich Qwen), results by question, interpretation and caveats.
Earlier pilot 2 pages (superseded, kept for old links)
- v2 design
- The original v2 design page, with more training rows.
- v2 results
- Qwen vs Llama, with sampled-reply and log-prob checks not repeated on the new page.
- Chatty pilot
- Maya vs chatty Llama, one seed, with register-leakage metrics.
- Professor arms
- Unnamed vs named professor, one seed each.
What didn’t work
- Pilot 1: SDF
- Synthetic documents about Qwen taught the model to recite facts about Qwen, not to have the quirk. Abandoned.
- Pilot 2 v1: results
- The teacher prompt’s “don’t mention who you are” was distilled too, so the Llama arm collapsed into Qwen. Fixed in v2.
What’s next
- More seeds: a third for every arm, and a second for the unnamed professor and the control-persona arms.
- Separate Maya’s register and data from her distinctness, and test whether rich Qwen’s dip in Qwen-labelled contexts is the data artifact we suspect.
- An OLMo 3 checkpoint sweep (SFT → DPO → Instruct) with collaborator Agastya: does self-leakage appear or grow at a particular post-training stage?
- Value-laden traits instead of a fruit preference, such as a stance on animal suffering: do values leak more than tastes?
- Opposite traits in one model: one persona loves apples, another dislikes them. Which side does the default take?
- Broader behavioral evals of each trained arm, beyond fruit.